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A b s t r a c t 
Background and objectives: Implicit attitudes (associations) are involved in the generation of 
substance use behaviors. However, little is known about the role of this automatic cognitive 
processing in deregulated behaviors without substance use, such as abnormal gambling. This 
study examined whether problem gamblers exhibit both positive and negative implicit 
attitudes toward gambling-related stimuli. Methods: Twenty-five problem gamblers and 25 
control participants performed two unipolar (pleasant; unpleasant) Single-Target Implicit 
Association Tasks (unipolar ST-IAT), in which gambling pictures were associated with either 
pleasant (or unpleasant for the negative unipolar ST-IAT) or neutral words. Explicit attitudes 
toward gambling were also recorded. Results:We found in problem gamblers: (i) both positive 
implicit and explicit attitudes toward gambling; (ii) no negative implicit gambling association; 
(iii) that only positive explicit attitudes positively correlated with the gambling severity score. 
Limitations: (i) the use of only one type of reaction time task; (ii) the use of both words and 
pictures in a same IAT; (iii) problem gamblers have been compared to non-gamblers instead 
of being contrasted with healthy non-problem gamblers. Conclusions: Whereas our gamblers 
experienced deleterious effects related to gambling, implicit attitude toward gambling 
remained positive, thus hampering attempts to quit gambling. Possible clinical interventions 





Why do gamblers continue to gamble despite of the occurrence of associated negative 
consequences? We addressed this question in focusing on implicit attitudes toward gambling 
in a sample of gamblers who encountered and reported problem gambling. Implicit attitudes 
tend to reveal automatic, impulsive mental processes are supposed to overcome some of the 
intrinsic limitations of self-report measures (e.g., De Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & 
De Beul, 2004). Implicit measures would be less susceptible to self-presentation or deception 
when they are used to assess socially sensitive or stigmatized issues, such as addiction. In 
contrast with substance addiction (for a review see, Wiers & Stacy, 2006), little is known 
about implicit attitudes in problem gambling. Indeed, so far, only one study has directly 
investigated implicit attitude toward gambling in problem gamblers (Yi & Kanetkar, 2010). In 
this study, problem gamblers held more positive attitudes toward gambling than did both non-
problem gamblers and non-gamblers. In other terms, in these gamblers, negative 
consequences had no impact on positive-gambling associations. However, a limitation of Yi 
and Kanetkar’s study (2010) was that they used a bipolar version of the Implicit Association 
Task (IAT), which measures the relative implicit attitude toward gambling (i.e., gamblers 
hold stronger positive than negative association toward gambling). In order to track possible 
state of dual-attitudes (both positive negative) toward gambling (i.e., ambivalence), we used 
a unipolar variant of the IAT that presents the attribute dimension in a unipolar format 
(Houben & Wiers, 2008). Specifically, while the bipolar IAT contrasts two attribute 
categories with each other (e.g., positive vs. negative), unipolar IATs contrast the same 
attribute categories with neutral categories (e.g., positive vs. neutral and negative vs. neutral). 
This methodology will then make possible to investigate possible ambivalence, which has 
been recognized as an important feature of addictive behaviors (Miller & Rollnick, 1991). 
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Our main hypothesis was that although problem gamblers exhibit stronger positive than 
negative association with gambling, the negative side of implicit processing is present and 
may reflect the implicit signature of a state of ambivalence. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Participants were 25 problem gamblers (PrG) and 25 nongamblers participants. All subjects 
were adults (>18 years old). They all provided informed consent that was approved by the 
appropriate human subject committee at the Brugmann University Hospital. The demographic 
data for the two groups are described in Table 1. 
2.2. Recruitment and screening methods 
Gamblers were recruited through advertisement in the casino complex VIAGE, Brussels, 
Belgium. The ads asked for participants who “gambled frequently” to participate in a one day 
study to explore factors associated with gambling. In order to exclude occasional or non-
frequent gamblers, a telephone screening interview was conducted by means of a locally 
developed screening tool, which included an examination of frequency of gambling behavior 
and comorbid psychiatric disorders. We excluded any subject who had a) over than 65 years, 
b) experienced either a substance use disorder during the year before enrollment into the 
study. Participants were judged to be medically healthy on the basis of the results of their 
medical history. Substance use and medical history were examined on the basis of items taken 
from the Addiction Severity Index Short Form. In addition, participants were asked to avoid 
alcohol consumption for the preceding 24 h of the testing. Gambling dependence severity was 
assessed with the South Oaks Gambling screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987). All PrG 
(n ¼ 25) scored _ 3 on the SOGS, indicative of problem gambling, and 15 participants (60% 
of the whole sample) met the more stringent criteria for probable pathological gambling 
(SOGS _ 5). 
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For instance, all participants who scored _ 5 and 4 participants (40%) who scored _ 3 on the 
SOGS respond “Yes” for the item “Do you feel you have ever had a problem with betting or 
money gambling?”. Controls were recruited by word of mouth from the employees belonging 
to the psychiatric department of the Brugmann University Hospital. To avoid biases, resulting 
from inside knowledge of how these tasks operate, psychiatrists, psychologists and other 
personnel having had psychological training were excluded from participation. 
2.3. Current clinical status 
Current clinical status of depression and anxiety was rated with French versions of the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and the Spielberger 
Statee Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983), respectively. 
2.4. Positive and negative unipolar ST-IAT 
Participants performed a positive and a negative unipolar Single Target IAT (ST-IAT; 
Houben & Wiers, 2008). The «gambling» target category consisted of 5 gambling pictures 
(label «gambling»). Gambling pictures consisted of 5 full color photographs (height ¼ 3.15 
inches, width ¼ 2.17 inches), each of them depicting one gambling-related object (i.e., slot 
machine; cards; casino chips; roulette; dice). Pictures appeared in the center of a 17 inch 
screen. In the positive unipolar ST-task variants, the positive attribute category (label 
«pleasant»), consisting of 5 positive words and the neutral attribute (label «neutral») consisted 
of 5 neutral words. Further, in the negative unipolar task variants, the negative attribute 
category (label «unpleasant») consisted of 5 negative words and the neutral attribute (label 
«neutral») consisted of 5 neutral words. The number of letters and frequency of positive, 
negative and neutral words (see Appendix A) were selected with Wordgen (Duyck, Desmet, 
Verbeke, & Brysbaert, 2004). The pleasant unipolar ST-IAT and the negative unipolar ST-
IAT consisted of 4 blocks. In both unipolar ST-IAT variants, participants first practiced the 
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attribute classification (pleasant vs. neutral or unpleasant vs. neutral) during which all 
attribute stimuli were presented twice. Next, they received the combination block during 
which gambling target and attribute stimuli were presented twice for a total of 40 trials. 
Participants then practiced the reversed attribute discrimination, followed by the reversed 
combination block. Key assignment (i.e., lefteright) and order of combination block (i.e., 
neutral or pleasant/unpleasant vs. gambling; gambling or pleasant/ unpleasant vs. neutral) 
were randomly counterbalanced for one half of the participants, and no significant effect of 
key assignment and order of combination block was found. 
2.5. Explicit gambling-related attitudes 
Explicit gambling-related attitudes were assessed with the Gambling Attitudes and Beliefs 
Scale (GABS; Breen & Zuckerman, 1999). The GABS is a 35-items scale, which is anchored 
by strongly disagree and strongly agree (4-point scale). GABS items were constructed to 
capture a wide array of positive evaluation of gambling (e.g., “Gambling makes me feel 
alive”), cognitive biases and irrational beliefs (e.g., “Sometimes I just know I am going to 
have good luck”), and chasing behaviors (e.g., “If I lose, it is important to stick with it until I 
get even”). According to Breen and Zuckerman (1999), the GABS is characterized by a 
unidimensional construct, which can be interpreted as a general affinity to gambling. 
Participants first received the two unipolar ST-IAT and then problem gamblers received the 
GABS. 
3. Results 
3.1. Demographics and current clinical status (see Table 1)  
Depression was higher in PrG than in controls, t(49) ¼ _2.91, p < 0.01. State and Trait 
anxiety was higher in the PrG group in comparison with the control group, t(49) ¼ _2.74, p < 
0.01; t(49) ¼ _2.79, p < 0.01, respectively. Importantly, comparisons between PrG and 
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controls on the positive unipolar ST-IAT remained statistically significant when potentially 
confounding variables (depression, trait and state anxiety) were individually entered as 
covariate into the statistical model. 
3.2. Positive and negative unipolar ST-IAT 
Unipolar ST-IAT effects were calculated with the D600 scoring algorithm (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). For the positive and negative unipolar ST-IATs, the D600 
measurewas calculated so that higher scores indicate faster performance when gambling was 
paired with pleasant or unpleasant attributes, respectively. Further, following the formula 
presented by Greenwald et al. (2003), practice trials were always included, error penalties 
(600 ms) were given, and results were standardized at the level of the participant. 
Preparatory analyses revealed no influential outliers on unipolar ST-IAT data. On the basis of 
Karpinski and Steinman’s method (2006), unipolar ST-IAT measures revealed an acceptable 
level of internal consistency (Positive, adjusted r ¼ 0.73; Negative, adjusted r ¼ 0.71). 
In problem gamblers, with respect to the positive and negative unipolar IAT, results showed 
that negative unipolar ST-IAT effects were not significant, t(24)¼_1.11, p ¼ 0.29, while 
positive unipolar ST-IAT effects were significant, t(24) ¼ 2.16, p < 0.05. Hence, these 
findings demonstrate positive implicit gambling associations in problem gamblers but not 
negative implicit gambling associations when implicit associations with gambling were 
assessed relative to neutral words. In the control group we observed no significant 
effect for both positive and negative unipolar ST-IAT, t(24)¼ _1.18, p ¼ 0.24; t(24) ¼ 0.86, p 
¼ 0.52, respectively. Furthermore, a oneway ANOVA revealed a group difference between 
controls (M ¼ _0.15, SD ¼ 0.62) and gamblers (M ¼ 0.36, SD ¼ 0.83) participants on D600 
scores for the positive unipolar ST-IAT, F(1,49) ¼ 5.64, p < 0.05, but not for the negative 
unipolar ST-IAT (controls: M ¼ 0.18, SD ¼ 0.78; problem gamblers: M ¼ 0.14, 
SD ¼ 0.68; F < 1). 
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3.3. Explicit gambling-related attitudes 
In problem gamblers (M ¼ 2.67, SD ¼ 0.07), a one sample t-test revealed that mean scores on 
the GABS were significantly different from the midpoints (i.e., 2.5), t(24) ¼ 2.10, p < 05, 
which indicated positive explicit attitudes toward gambling in problem gamblers. 
This score was also positively correlated with SOGS scores, r(25) ¼ 0.51, p < 0.01.We found 
no significant correlation between the GABS (i.e., explicit cognition) and the positive 
unipolar ST-IAT (i.e., implicit cognition), r(25) ¼ 0.19, p ¼ 0.41. There was also no 
significant correlation between the SOGS and performances on the positive unipolar ST-IAT, 
r(25) ¼ 0.31, p ¼ 0.13. In addition, regression analyses carried out in problem gamblers 
showed that positive and negative ST-IAT scores did not add to the contribution 
of gambling problems after controlling for explicit attitude scores (see Table 2). 
4. Discussion 
In this study, we found that, compared with non-gamblers, problem gamblers exhibit positive, 
but not negative, implicit attitudes toward gambling-related pictures. Positive explicit 
attitudes toward gambling, which correlates with problem gambling, also characterized 
problem gamblers. 
Our results add important information to a previous study showing positive implicit 
associations in problem gamblers (Yi & Kanetkar, 2010). Because of our choice to use a 
unipolar measure of implicit attitudes, we ruled out the possibility that problem 
gamblingwas associated with both positive and negative automatic associations. This finding 
is important because in our gamblers sample, participants had experienced a number of 
deleterious consequences in relation to their gambling behaviors (e.g., most participants 
agreed with the assumption that they feel that they ever had a problem with betting or money 
gambling). Importantly, we found no sign of dual implicit (both positive negative) attitudes 
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in problem gamblers toward their gambling behaviors. One explanation could be that at the 
time of the experiment, problem gamblers did not “really” make the connection between these 
negative outcomes and their gambling behaviors. This might reflect impaired self-awareness 
in problem gamblers (e.g., Brevers et al., 2012), which could possibly hamper their ability to 
recognize the severity of their disorder (i.e., lack of insight; Goldstein et al., 2009) and would 
make initial and salient positive implicit gambling associations and gambling behaviors 
unchanged. Thus, positive implicit and explicit attitudes toward gambling might be one of the 
driving forces behind the persistence of gambling despite the occurrence of severe deleterious 
consequences. What could be made for generating negative associations with gambling? 
Intervention strategies aimed to reducing the salience of gambling behaviors by acting 
through the modification of both explicit and implicit attitudes toward gambling is an option. 
For instance, implicit stereotypes (e.g., black þ unpleasant; white þ pleasant) can be modified 
through implementation intentions (e.g., Stewart & Payne, 2008). Implementation intentions 
(Gollwitzer,1993) are if-then plans that supplement goal intentions (e.g., «Gambling is not 
good for me») by specifying (i) a good opportunity to act (e.g., «If gambling and negative 
appear together.»), and (ii) a consistent goal-directed response to that opportunity is 
encountered (e.g., «. then I respond especially fast to gambling words and negative words!»). 
Thus, one may expect that cognitive interventions, such as implementation intentions, alter 
the strength of implicit positive gambling associations, which may in turn lead to changes in 
the motivation process (e.g., more ambivalence) that could lead to a behavioral update. Future 
works should address this important clinical issue. 
Some limitations should be noted. First, an alternative explanation of current results is that the 
negative unipolar ST-IAT used in this study was not sensitive enough to detect a negative 
implicit association toward gambling in problem gamblers. Indeed, IAT is a relative rather 
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than an absolute measure in that it does not exclusively measures the association between 
concepts (e.g., De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). For instance, 
Bluemke and Friese (2006) found stronger IAT effects in East German participants in 
conditions with in group-congruent target stimuli (e.g., West-positive, East-negative) and/or 
in groupcongruent attribute stimuli (e.g., positive-West, negative-East). In this context, the 
chances of finding implicit negative associations toward gambling in problem gamblers 
during a negative unipolar ST-IAT might be larger with negative gambling-congruent target 
stimuli (e.g., pictures related to the loss) and/or negative gambling congruent attribute stimuli 
(e.g. the word “loss”). As a second limitation, we used both words (i.e., positive, negative and 
neutral attributes) and pictures (i.e., gambling target) stimuli, which is contestable. Indeed, 
there is evidence that, compared with words, pictorial stimuli more directly activate the 
associated attitude in memory (e.g. De Houwer & Hermans, 1994). Hence, present IAT 
scores might be less reliable that those obtained with the use of words or pictures stimuli only. 
Third, despite acceptable internal consistency of the current ST-IAT, the use of only one type 
of reaction time (RT) task is a limitation. For instance, the use of only one RT did not allow 
the estimation of measurement error of multiple reaction time tasks (Cunningham, Preacher, 
& Banaji, 2001). Moreover, Houben, Nosek, and Wiers (2010) reported that drinking 
behavior is better predicted by bipolar IAT as compared with unipolar IAT. Therefore, it 
would be advisable to examine implicit attitudes toward gambling with both bipolar and 
unipolar IAT in a same study design. Fourth, in this paper, because of the absence of non-
problem gamblers (most of our controls were nongamblers), we cannot isolate the “problem 
gambling” component per se. This limits the generalizability of our results. Finally, due to 
small sample size, non-significant results (e.g., no significant correlation between SOGS 
scores and performances on positive unipolar IAT) must be interpreted with caution. 
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In conclusion, we found no evidence of negative associations with gambling in a sample of 
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Appendix A. Attribute stimuli 
Positive: plaisir (pleasure), liberté (freedom), loisir (leisure), joie (joy), amis (friends). 
Negative: dégout (disgust), ennui (boredom), douleur (pain), colère (anger), tristesse 
(sadness). 
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